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Now all be ashes, the conveyancers pass, to be one with Babylon and Tyre. 
Great is Diana of the Ephesians, for the solicitors remain. -- EH Tebbutt1 
 
 
I   INTRODUCTION2 
 
Queensland is now the only State in Australia to reserve conveyancing work 
exclusively for solicitors.3 This is, of course, a source of lingering controversy and 
resentment, especially amongst nonlawyer conveyancers elsewhere in Australia who, 
despite enjoying a long history, have grown most significantly in numbers and 
market profile since the 1990s. 
The reasons offered for the exclusive reservation of conveyancing work for 
solicitors in Queensland have shifted over time. In the justification given for it in 
2004 to the National Competition Council, the State Government submitted, in short, 
that Queensland markets for conveyancing services were already competitive and 
that, in general, the costs of regulating nonlawyer conveyancers and assuring 
adequate protection for consumers were likely to exceed the minimal benefits that 
lowering barriers to entry might bring.4 The National Competition Council disagreed 
with this,5 and so the Government remains under an obligation to provide a rationale 
– acceptable to the Council – for what the Council considers is an uncompetitive 
arrangement.6 In this article, and a second that will follow in a later edition of the 
University of Queensland Law Journal, we therefore revisit the Queensland 
solicitors’ conveyancing reservation. The next section is an account of the nature and 
scope of the reservation. This includes its historical development – a process that, 
despite the debate of the last two decades, was in the strictest legal terms only 
properly completed in 2004. The legal ground covered by the reservation is also 
outlined. It involves an analysis of the scope of the reservation, and the extent to 
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1  ‘Exit the “Conveyancer”: No Furniture Removed’, Sydney Morning Herald, 14 June 
1930, 14.  
2  In this article Qld is meant to mean the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) and Model 
Laws refers to the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General under Legal Profession – 
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which the solicitors’ branch of the legal profession (when considered as a group) can 
genuinely be considered to have ‘monopolised’ the field of conveyancing work.  
In the second article, we will consider the competition implications of the 
reservation, and the arguments for and against maintaining it. We will also conclude 
with suggestions as to how any lines of debate over the introduction of nonlawyer 
conveyancing in the State could be refined and whether, given existing reforms, 
there is any greater need to lower barriers to entry to conveyancing markets.  
There is nevertheless a preliminary point to make about terminology. This 
reservation is sometimes loosely called a ‘monopoly’.7 However, in the usual 
language of competition law and policy, there is strictly no monopoly in the 
provision of conveyancing services in Queensland. A monopoly is a market 
condition in which a single seller of, here, a service deals with a large number of 
buyers, and the seller has complete control over the price at which the service is 
sold.8 In offering legal services of any kind, including the conduct of a conveyance, 
solicitors do not act through the profession as a single entity that controls the markets 
for selling these services. These services are provided by any of more than 1300 
solicitors’ practices in Queensland, and of even more law practices in other States 
that, under national legal profession arrangements, are also entitled to practise law in 
the State.9 So, rather than granting a monopoly, the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) 
(which contains the reservation) actually provides a barrier to entry into the market.10 
This barrier is structural, in the sense that it is created by the Act as a limitation on 
the conduct of potential market participants.11 It prohibits nonlawyers from offering 
the service, and limits the work to those who have certain professional qualifications 
(which import requirements of education and training). The question of nonlawyer 
conveyancing in Queensland is therefore not one of breaking a monopoly. It is 
whether the barrier to entry should be lowered to extend the class of persons lawfully 
able to provide the service; to retain a barrier, but to ease the qualifications needed to 
leap over it. 
 
 
II   THE RESERVATION ON LAND TRANSACTIONS 
 
A   Development 
 
1   Antecedents 
 
English attorneys’ common involvement in land transactions through the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was largely an aspect of their work as law 
agents and estate managers for landholders. However, in efforts to secure more of 
this work their training as officers of the Court of Common Pleas (the court that 
heard litigation involving land) gradually grew in importance. Still, conveyancing 
was no exclusive reservation for attorneys. In the provinces, nonlawyer 
conveyancers competed with attorneys for the work. In the City of London, all 
lawyers were actually prohibited from undertaking conveyancing work in 1712, 
when it was exclusively reserved for members of the Scriveners’ Company. Lawyers 
                                                 
7  See eg, Law Society of NSW v Ramalca Pty Ltd (1988) 12 NSWLR 34, 35 (Priestley 
JA).  
8  Peter Butt (ed), Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (3rd ed, 2004) 286.   
9  Qld, ss 5(1), 6(1), 24(1). 
10  As to barriers to entry generally refer to Stephen Corones, Competition Law in Australia 
(4th ed, 2007) 110. 
11  For a definition of barriers to entry and a discussion of structural barriers refer to Boral 
Besser Masonary Limited v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374, 471. 
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themselves litigated strenuously through the mid-eighteenth century to break the 
scriveners’ reservation in the City; a number of barristers acted pro bono in this 
litigation in the general interests of the legal profession. They finally succeeded in 
gaining access to the London conveyancing market in 1760,12 and then moved 
steadily to establish an exclusive reservation for lawyers across the whole of England 
and Wales. This came with the Stamp Act 1804 (UK). The taxes stimulated by 
demand for public finance in the Napoleonic Wars included high stamp duties on 
articles of clerkship, and attorneys’ admission and practising certificates. 
Conveyancing work was therefore eventually reserved exclusively for lawyers as 
compensation. Any person who was not an attorney or barrister but who undertook 
conveyancing work was exposed to a fine of up to £50.13 Still, this did not 
completely secure an exclusive reservation for attorneys. The bar’s interest in having 
access to lucrative land conveyancing was strongly evident in the assault on the 
scriveners’ reservation in the eighteenth century. Although this interest waned over 
the nineteenth century, the Inns of Court did not surrender the right of barristers to 
conduct land transactions until 190314 and, as late as the Solicitors Act 1941 (UK),15 
barristers were recognised as having a right to undertake conveyancing.  
Those reservations were not directly received into the law of any of the 
Australian colonies but, despite growing differences between the underlying land law 
of England and the colonies,16 the English arrangements were eventually mimicked. 
In New South Wales, land conveyancing remained unregulated until 1847, although, 
on the whole, the attorneys’ profession dominated the market.17 The Attorneys’ Bills 
and Conveyancing Act 1847 (NSW)18 gave the exclusive right to undertake 
conveyancing work to attorneys and solicitors, to barristers and to ‘Certificated 
Conveyancers’ who were specially licensed and examined by the Supreme Court to 
undertake land transactions, will making and some estate administration.19 The Act 
therefore initiated court-regulated, nonlawyer conveyancing. It was a scheme that 
would be maintained in NSW,20 Victoria21 and Queensland into the 1930s, although 
the number of court-licensed conveyancers in all three colonies was so small that 
they did not seriously threaten the dominant market position of attorneys and 
solicitors.22 
                                                 
12  Richard Abel, The Making of the English Legal Profession (1998) 139-40. 
13  Section 14 Stamp Act 1804 (UK) (44 Geo III c 98). See Abel, above n 12, 141; Penelope 
Cornfield, Power and the Professions in Britain, 1700-1850 (1995) 81. 
14  Abel, above n 12, 141. 
15  Section 47 Solicitors Act 1932 (UK); s 23 Solicitors Act 1941 (UK). 
16  Peter Butt, Land Law (5th ed, 2006) 5. 
17  Although barristers also enjoyed regular conveyancing work: John Michael Bennett, A 
History of Solicitors in NSW (1984) 327-8.  
18  2 Vic No 33 (NSW). 
19  Section 13 Attorneys’ Bills and Conveyancing Act 1847 (NSW). For a history of 
certificated conveyancers, see Bennett, above n 17, 328-41. 
20  In NSW, ss 13-14 Attorneys’ Bills and Conveyancing Act 1847 (NSW) were re-enacted 
in ss 16-20, 40 Legal Practitioners Act 1898 (NSW). Section 1 Conveyancers Enabling 
Act 1893 (NSW) opened Torrens land conveyancing to certificated conveyancers: see 
also s 10 Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). 
21  Fellows J held in Re Strong; Ex parte Campbell (1873) 4 AJR 300, 301-2 that the 
Attorneys’ Bills and Conveyancing Act 1847 (NSW) was received into the law of 
Victoria. Victoria also perpetuated ‘certified conveyancers’ by s 261 Supreme Court Act 
1890 (Vic), although apparently none were admitted after 1885: Bennett, above n 17, 
337.   
22  Bennett, above n 17, 340. The number of licensed conveyancers in NSW under this 
scheme peaked in 1925 at 72, although only around one-third actually practised: ibid, 
330, 337: Australian Institute of Conveyancers NSW Division, A Brief History of the 
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In South Australia, the underlying land law did (when compared with England) 
motivate differences in the structure of conveyancing markets. A more rational 
system of property holding was contemplated soon after settlement in 1837, but was 
not achieved. The more intensive landholding in South Australia and, therefore, the 
greater proportion of land transfers in the colony created conditions for excessive 
fraud and forgery in the conduct of land transactions. With the small number of 
lawyers, this meant that it became difficult to develop a workable conveyancing 
system.23 Procedures for transfers of land were substantially simplified by Sir Robert 
Torrens’ system of landholding, which also undeniably bore influences from systems 
of title by registration that German colonists had experienced in their homelands.24 
First implemented in the Real Property Act 1858 (SA), the Torrens system 
guaranteed title on registration of a transfer with the Land Titles Office, required 
separate issue by the Titles Office of certificates of title, transformed the mortgage 
into a charge instead of a conveyance, and used standard forms for different kinds of 
dealings in the land.25 It revolutionised, and again simplified, the nature of 
conveyancing work by removing the need for ‘retrospection’ – establishing whether 
there was a good ‘root of title’ by close scrutiny of all documents evidencing the 
chain of title from the original government grant of an estate. Lawyers vigorously 
opposed the Torrens reforms – both outside and inside the House of Assembly. It 
certainly had an adverse effect on their interests; the removal of retrospection 
significantly streamlined the work required to complete a land transaction. However, 
for a brief time the Act of 1858 exclusively reserved Torrens system conveyancing 
for the legal profession.26 That reservation, though, was lost when, by the Real 
Property Act 1860, South Australia introduced land brokers who, alongside lawyers, 
could undertake conveyancing work.27 Indeed, since 1860 South Australia has had 
an unbroken history of lawful nonlawyer conveyancing, and from that time has been 
the only Australian jurisdiction not to have made an exclusive reservation of 
conveyancing for the legal profession. 
Torrens legislation was next introduced in 1861 in Queensland,28 but (unlike 
South Australia) with the active sponsorship of leading lawyers.29 In 1862, it was 
adopted in Tasmania, Victoria and NSW, and in 1874 in Western Australia.30 An 
interesting feature of the introduction of Torrens legislation in NSW, and during 
debates over amendments in 1877 in Queensland, was the controversy created by 
proposals to introduce land brokers of the South Australian type.31 In the two eastern 
colonies, court-licensed conveyancers were already actually practising under the 
Attorneys’ Bills and Conveyancing Act 1847 (NSW) and its progeny in Queensland – 
the Supreme Court Act 1867.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                
NSW Conveyancing Profession <http://aicnsw.com.au/aicnsw_cms/index.php?page= 
conveyancing-history> at 6 December 2009. 
23  Robert Stein and Margaret Stone, Torrens Title (1991) 18. 
24  Ibid, 21-4. 
25  Ibid, 21. 
26  Section 95 Real Property Act 1858 (SA). 
27  Section 133 Real Property Act 1860 (SA). 
28  Real Property Act 1861 (Qld). 
29  Douglas Whalan, The Torrens System in Australia (1982) 8-9. 
30  Real Property Act 1862 (NSW); Real Property Act 1862 (Tas); Transfer of Land Statute 
1862 (Vic); Transfer of Land Act 1874 (WA). 
31  Whalan, above n 29, 9, 11. 
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2   Queensland – Certificated Conveyancers and Barristers  
 
The objections to land brokers in Queensland in 1877 were led in Parliament by 
the solicitor Charles Mein, Postmaster-General in the Douglas Government, who 
claimed that the land broking scheme had been unsuccessful in South Australia,32 
and that the suggested amendments to the Torrens legislation did not adequately 
protect against malpractice by licensed land brokers.33 It appears that, at this time, a 
large amount of conveyancing work was actually being done – illegally – by real 
estate agents and auctioneers, and could not be effectively controlled.34 The first 
Queensland Law Society had actually been reluctant to suggest prosecutions for 
illegal conveyancing; it apparently thought the enforcement of the Supreme Court 
Act’s reservations would strengthen public support for South Australian-style land 
brokers. And certainly, supporters of land brokers thought that the prevalence of 
illegal conveyancing suggested that nonlawyer conveyancing was quite feasible.35 In 
Parliament, Mein dismissed this; it should just ‘legalize what was done illegally’.36 
The suggested amendments to the Real Property Act also required that the broker’s 
oath be taken before the Registrar-General in Brisbane. So, Mein claimed that, if 
brokers were needed anywhere in Queensland it would be in ‘the interior’ where 
there was a shortage of lawyers. However, the requirements for the oath meant that 
brokers would in practice only be licensed in Brisbane.37 This was an argument 
against land brokers on which lawyers would soon perform a complete professional 
volte-face. Finally, he noted that there was already provision in Queensland for 
court-licensed conveyancers who had ‘to go through a large amount of training’ and 
that therefore ‘opportunity was afforded for competent persons … to become 
possessed of the necessary knowledge and to show their fitness for transacting real 
property business.’38 
In this last argument, Mein was referring to conveyancers who had been 
licensed under Queensland’s successor to the Attorneys’ Bills and Conveyancing Act, 
which had been carried into the laws of Queensland at the colony’s separation in 
1859. The scheme of the 1847 Act was perpetuated in Queensland until 1987 – when 
a practising certificate was last recorded as having been issued to a ‘Certificated 
Conveyancer’.39 In 1866, the Supreme Court had even grouped conveyancers with 
barristers-at-law and attorneys, solicitors and proctors in its admission rules.40 The 
Attorneys’ Bills and Conveyancing Act was repealed in Queensland in 1868,41 but 
                                                 
32  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates – Legislative Council, 31 May 1877, 26 (Charles 
Mein PMG).  
33  Ibid, 18 October 1877, 248 (Charles Mein PMG). 
34  See Helen Gregory, The Queensland Law Society Inc 1928-1988: A History (1991) 14, 
16, 28-9. 
35  See Queensland, above n 32, 248 (Charles Mein PMG), 249 (William Thornton), 250 
(Henry George Simpson). 
36  Ibid, 250 (Charles Mein PMG). 
37  Ibid, 248, 255 (Charles Mein PMG); and see also ibid, 251 (Gordon Sandeman). 
38  Ibid, 249 (Charles Mein PMG). 
39  Williams noted in 1982 that there were three names on the Supreme Court’s Roll of 
Conveyancers: GN Williams, Harrison’s Law and Conduct of the Legal Profession in 
Queensland (2nd ed, 1984) 14.  According to Sande and Registrar Supreme Court of 
Queensland [1995] AATA 593, [39] (‘Sande 1B’) and Sande v Registrar Supreme 
Court of Queensland (1996) 134 ALR 560, 571 (‘Sande 1D’) a Mr Garde, who was 
admitted as a conveyancer in 1935, took a conveyancer’s certificate in 1987.  
40  Rules Relating to the Admission of Barristers, Solicitors, Proctors and Conveyancers 
1866 (Qld).  
41  Section 2 and Sch Repealing Act 1867 (Qld) (31 Vic No 39). 
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the provisions establishing a conveyancing reservation had already been patriated in 
the Supreme Court Act.42 Section 41 stated: 
 
Every person who shall for or in respect of any fee gain or reward directly or 
indirectly draw or prepare any conveyance or any other deed or instrument in 
writing relating to any real estate (other than and except barristers or attorneys and 
solicitors of the Supreme Court or certified conveyancers as hereinafter mentioned 
…) shall be guilty of contempt of the Supreme Court and shall and may be punished 
accordingly.43 
 
The ‘conveyancers’ mentioned in section 41 had to apply to the Supreme Court 
for their certificates; indeed, they were ‘admitted’ by the court as conveyancers 
under the rules of 1866. An examination was to be held by the Master in Equity on 
the applicant’s ‘skill and knowledge in conveyancing as well as to his character for 
integrity’,44 before admission was granted and the court could award a certificate. 
In the 1880s, the number of prosecutions for illegal conveyancing began to 
escalate and, at this point, it was becoming clearer that regional solicitors were much 
more concerned than their Brisbane counterparts to enforce the Supreme Court Act’s 
reservations.45 However, this period also saw greater opportunities for barristers to 
conduct land transactions. As seen, the Supreme Court Act also provided that a 
barrister could undertake conveyancing work – as was the case in NSW, Victoria and 
England. Idiosyncratic arrangements for the fusion of the two branches of the legal 
profession in the colony would soon reinforce the prospect of barrister 
conveyancing. Although, in general, the legal profession tried to prevent its passage, 
the Legal Practitioners Act 1881 (Qld) aimed to amalgamate the functions of 
lawyers by providing that barristers could practise as solicitors and solicitors could 
practise as barristers.46 Ostensibly to improve access to the courts outside Brisbane 
by giving solicitors rights of appearance, the Act also had potential to deal with the 
problem of an oversupply of barristers in the colony (given the paucity of work for 
them even in Brisbane) by entitling barristers to a broader range of legal work and 
enabling them to practise in regional towns.47 It is not possible to identify how many 
barristers took advantage of the Supreme Court Act or of the 1881 legislation to 
conduct land transactions. However, in the 1890s there were barristers practising in 
regional centres other than Rockhampton and Townsville (where the Supreme Court 
sat permanently),48 and it is almost certain they could only do so by taking on work 
that traditionally belonged to attorneys and solicitors. 
The earliest statutory regulation of lawyers in Queensland was initiated in 1927 
by the Queensland Law Association – the solicitors’ professional guild – but had to 
                                                 
42  Even though it was in exactly the same terms as the NSW and Victorian provisions, 
they were criticised from outside Queensland as protectionist measures against 
competition from intercolonial lawyers: see BH McPherson, The Supreme Court of 
Queensland 1859-1960: History, Jurisdiction, Procedure (1989) 81. 
43  See also s 13 Attorneys’ Bills and Conveyancing Act 1847 (NSW).  
44  Section 42 Supreme Court Act 1867 (Qld); see also s 14 Attorneys’ Bills and 
Conveyancing Act 1847 (NSW).  
45  Gregory, above n 34, 40, 61. 
46  Section 1 Legal Practitioners Act 1881 (Qld). See generally, Michael White, ‘The 
Development of the Divided Profession in Queensland’ (2004) 23 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 296, 313-14.  
47  In 1881, Arthur Rutledge thought there was enough work in Brisbane for only four 
barristers: Ross Johnston, History of the Queensland Bar (1978) 27-8.  
48  Section 4 Supreme Court Act 1895 (Qld). Barristers were known to practise in Gympie, 
Longreach, Bundaberg, Toowoomba, Charters Towers, Ingham and Cairns: Johnston, 
above n 478, 30-1.  
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deal both with the merged roles of barristers and solicitors and with the related 
practice of court-licensed nonlawyer conveyancers. As a result, the Queensland Law 
Society, as the Association was renamed, was eventually to gain the power to issue 
practising certificates and to seek the discipline of any person who, whatever their 
professional title, practised ‘as a solicitor or conveyancer’.49 Although the 
Queensland Law Society Act was first passed in 1927, it was an amending Act of 
1930 that referred to any ‘barrister-at-law practising as a solicitor’, ‘solicitor of the 
Supreme Court’ or ‘conveyancer’ by the clumsy and tautological term ‘practising 
practitioner’.50 The Queensland Law Society was given the power to issue 
‘solicitors’ certificates to any solicitor or barrister who wished to practise as a 
solicitor,51 and ‘conveyancers’ certificates to any conveyancer who wished to 
practise as a conveyancer.52 Certificates had to be taken out every year. It was illegal 
for someone to do solicitors’ or conveyancers’ work unless he held a practising 
certificate issued by the Law Society.53 Similarly, all of these ‘practising 
practitioners’ were within the jurisdiction of the Statutory Committee – the 
disciplinary tribunal run by the Law Society, which could hear charges of 
malpractice, professional misconduct or unprofessional conduct.54 Through the 
1920s and 1930s, straitened economic conditions compelled a number of barristers to 
practise as solicitors, and by 1938 there were 30 barristers (or 20 percent of the 
admitted bar) holding solicitors’ practising certificates.55 Sometime in the 1930s, the 
Law Society even sought discipline against a barrister who was evidently within the 
Society’s regulatory purview.56 
However, by any measure the Act of 1881’s attempt to fuse professional 
functions in Queensland was poorly thought out. From inception, the idea of 
maintaining different rolls but allowing access to the same work raised questions of 
the different education and training required for each branch of the profession (and 
here solicitors had the higher standards).57 The Supreme Court judges had even 
denied that any period of practical training under articles with a barrister could 
qualify someone for admission as a solicitor.58 As a result, it appears that admission 
to the bar was being used as an easier means of qualifying to do solicitor’s work 
without the practical training that admission as a solicitor needed. This was a 
principal reason for returning in the late 1930s to a fully divided legal profession.59 
Unlike the Act of 1881, the Legal Practitioners Act Amendment Act 1938 (Qld) 
was passed without any serious political controversy.60 It rationalised the legal 
                                                 
49  Cf Gregory, above n 34, 67. 
50  Section 36 Queensland Law Society Act 1930 (Qld); s 3 Queensland Law Society Act 
1952 (Qld). 
51  Section 26(1) Queensland Law Society Act 1930 (Qld); s 38(1) Queensland Law Society 
Act 1952 (Qld). 
52  Section 26(2) Queensland Law Society Act 1930 (Qld); s 38(2) Queensland Law Society 
Act 1952 (Qld). 
53  Section 27 Queensland Law Society Act 1930 (Qld); s 39 Queensland Law Society Act 
1952 (Qld). 
54  Section 5(1) Queensland Law Society Act 1927 (Qld); s 6(1) Queensland Law Society 
Act 1952 (Qld). 
55  Johnston, above n 47, 32, 139.  
56  The barrister’s identity and the charge remain undisclosed: Linda Haller, ‘Solicitors’ 
Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A Statistical Analysis’ (2001) 13 Bond 
Law Review 1, 7.   
57  Johnston, above n 47, 29. 
58  Re Walker (1897) 8 QLJ 61. 
59  Johnston, above n 47, 29. See the comments of Hoare J in Ex parte Solicitors’ Board of 
Queensland [1979] Qd R 133, 135-6; and White, above n 46, 315-16. 
60  White, above n 46, 315-16. 
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profession and laid the ground for the current location of the conveyancing 
reservation exclusively in the solicitors’ branch – although some loose ends were not 
tied up until 2004. Two significant steps were taken. First, barristers were prohibited 
from practising as solicitors, and solicitors as barristers.61 Those barristers who had 
been ‘practising practitioners’ were given the option of admission as solicitors (so 
long as they had three years of actual practice).62 Most took that option.63 Secondly, 
court-licensed conveyancers were marked for extinction. No more conveyancers 
were to be admitted after 1 January 1940.64 Similar moves had been made in Victoria 
in 1915,65 and NSW in 1935.66 Although they were given the option of seeking 
admission as solicitors,67 it was possible for Queensland conveyancers admitted 
before 1940 to continue to practise only as conveyancers and to be issued with 
conveyancers’ certificates by the Law Society.68 The last that one of these 
conveyancers took out a practising certificate was in 1987.69 Law Society records 
have at least two conveyancers facing discipline before the Statutory Committee 
after the regulatory reforms of 1930.70 From that point, the solicitors’ reservation for 
conveyancing was consolidated, although regional solicitors continued to complain 
about illegal conveyancing by real estate agents and provincial bank managers. They 
were also concerned about the lawful cut-price conveyancing services offered by the 
Public Curator. But, at the height of these concerns in the 1950s, the Queensland 
Law Society was still reluctant to prosecute so as to enforce the reservation.71    
The amending Act of 1938 still did not remove the Supreme Court Act’s 
recognition of the right of barristers to undertake conveyancing. There is 
nevertheless no evidence of barristers attempting to undertake conveyancing work 
after the re-division of the profession in 1938. The Law Society actually tried to ban 
barristers from conveyancing in the Queensland Law Society Rule by limiting 
conveyancing practice to solicitors and the remnant of court-licensed conveyancers. 
Amongst other things, the Rule tried to define the term ‘acting as a conveyancer’ 
(which was found in the Queensland Law Society Act 1930)72 as ‘drawing, preparing, 
filing for registration on behalf of any person of (a) any deed [or] (b) any instrument 
in writing relating to real estate’.73 It turned out that this was futile. On the first 
occasion the Rule was tested in litigation on the conveyancing reservation, the 
Supreme Court made the obvious point that subordinate legislation cannot be used to 
define the scope of a penal provision in the Act it is made under.74 Precisely the same 
                                                 
61  Section 5 Legal Practitioners Act Amendment Act 1938 (Qld). 
62  Section 6 Legal Practitioners Act Amendment Act 1938 (Qld). 
63  Johnston, above n 47, 32. 
64  Section 2 Legal Practitioners Act Amendment Act 1938 (Qld). 
65  Section 24 Legal Profession Practice Act 1915 (Vic) reserved conveyancing work 
exclusively for barristers and solicitors.  
66  Section 8(c) Legal Practitioners Amendment Act 1935 (NSW); s 20A(1) Legal 
Practitioners Act 1898 (NSW). There were 56 conveyancers in NSW at the time, but 
‘far fewer actually practised’: Bennett, above n 17, 339. 
67  Section 3 Legal Practitioners Act Amendment Act 1938 (Qld). This was subject to 
conditions related to experience and meeting examination requirements. 
68  Section 26(2) Queensland Law Society Act 1930 (Qld); s 38(2) Queensland Law Society 
Act 1952 (Qld); Gregory, above n 34, 78. 
69  See above n 39.  
70  Haller, above n 56, 7. 
71  Gregory, above n 34, 114-16. 
72  Section 27 Queensland Law Society Act 1930 (Qld); s 39 Queensland Law Society Act 
1952 (Qld). 
73  R 102(4) Queensland Law Society Rule 1987 (Qld); and see Williams, above n 39, 17. 
74  Queensland Law Society Incorporated v Sande (No 2) [1988] 1 Qd R 273, 290 (‘Sande 
2B’). 
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point could be made about the Rule’s incompatibility with the Supreme Court Act, 
and therefore its inability to criminalise conveyancing by barristers. 
The right of barristers to undertake conveyancing technically persisted until 
2004. Although the Bar Association adopted rules in 1995 that prohibited its 
members from ‘conduct[ing] the conveyance of any property for any other person’,75 
the rule did not apply to barristers who were not members and, being enforceable 
only as a contractual obligation, could not displace the right of a barrister under the 
Supreme Court Act 1867 to undertake conveyancing work.76 This right was only 
removed when section 41 of the Supreme Court Act was repealed with the passage of 
the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld).77 The repeal was also reinforced when, under 
the reforms of 2004, the Bar Association’s ban on barristers undertaking 
conveyancing work was given the status of subordinate legislation applicable to all 
barristers.78 The reforms of 2004 took effect from 1 July, and from that point the 
reservation of conveyancing work in Queensland was exclusive to solicitors. 
 
3   Modern Conveyancers   
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, competition-based reforms had seen licensed 
nonlawyer conveyancers re-surface in NSW, the Northern Territory and Western 
Australia.79 South Australia, of course, had had its land brokers since the Torrens 
legislation of 1860. Tasmania allowed nonlawyer conveyancing in 2004.80 In 
Victoria, a limited form of nonlawyer conveyancing was long thought possible 
because of an ambiguous understanding of the nature of ‘legal practice’, but was 
expressly allowed by statute from 1996 so long as the conveyancer did not prepare 
documents that created, varied, transferred or extinguished interests in land or gave 
legal advice.81 In 2006, the Law Institute of Victoria attempted to enforce this 
restriction by seeking an injunction against a licensed conveyancer who, the Institute 
alleged, gave legal advice by providing a statement which gave details of mortgages, 
charges and other factors affecting the land. However, Osborn J did not think that 
such a statement necessarily involved the giving of legal advice, and refused the 
injunction.82 This restriction on nonlawyer conveyancers was lifted by statute later in 
2006.83 It left only Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory reserving 
conveyancing work exclusively to solicitors, with most of the lobbying to lower the 
barriers to enter the conveyancing market focused on Queensland. 
Associated with the relaxation of the lawyers’ reservation on conveyancing in 
most Australian jurisdictions has been the industry organisation of nonlawyer 
conveyancers. Not surprisingly, it was South Australian land brokers who first 
formed an industry association in 1973.84 This was followed by the Western 
                                                 
75  R 78(g) Queensland Barristers Rules 1995. 
76  Section 44 Supreme Court Act 1867 (Qld) was included and perpetuated as section 19 of 
the consolidating Legal Practitioners Act 1995 (Qld). 
77  Section 632 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld). 
78  Rule 78(g) Legal Profession (Barristers) Rule 2004 (Qld). 
79  See now s 14(2)(e) Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW); Conveyancers Licensing Act 
2003 (NSW); s 14(2)(e) Legal Profession Act (NT); Agents Licensing Act (NT); s 
12(3)(e) Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA); Settlement Agents Act 1981 (WA). 
80  Conveyancing Act 2004 (Tas). 
81  Section 326 Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic). 
82  Law Institute of Victoria v Maric [2006] VSC 361, [101]-[105].  
83  Conveyancers Act 2006 (Vic). 
84  Australian Institute of Conveyancers SA Division, A South Australian Success Story 
<www.aicsa.com.au/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=34> at 14 May 2009. 
Vol 28 (2) The Queensland Solicitors’ Conveyancing Reservation 260 
 
Australian Settlement Agents Association in 1979.85 The Association of Property 
Conveyancers was formed in NSW in 1989 to lobby for nonlawyer conveyancing 
(which came in 1993),86 and the Victorian Conveyancers Association was formed in 
1991.87 Once more, it was the South Australian association that took the initiative to 
incorporate a national industry association – the Australian Institute of Conveyancers 
– in 1993. The AIC gradually absorbed the State-based associations as divisions of 
the national organisation, and added Tasmanian and Northern Territory Divisions 
when nonlawyer conveyancing emerged in those jurisdictions.   
 
4   The Sande Litigation88 
 
Since 1996, the AIC’s political efforts have concentrated on securing access for 
nonlawyer conveyancers to the lucrative Queensland property market. It has also 
given support to attempts by a South Australian land broker, Paul Sande, to open a 
conveyancing service on the Gold Coast. The Sande litigation has been critical to the 
legal refinement of the conveyancing reservation in Queensland and (as will be made 
clearer in our second article) to prospects for securing access to the Queensland 
market by rights to the interstate recognition of occupational status granted by the 
Mutual Recognition Act 1992 (Cth). The litigation aimed to secure Sande a 
conveyancer’s or solicitor’s certificate, although this was sought by the interplay (as 
Sande saw it) of applications for admission as a conveyancer or solicitor under the 
Supreme Court Act 1867 with the provisions of the Mutual Recognition Act. Sande 
applied to the Queensland Law Society in December 1993 for a conveyancer’s 
practising certificate so that he could conduct land transactions in Queensland. The 
Law Society refused this certificate, although the refusal was challenged, 
unsuccessfully, in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. However, before the AAT 
decision, Sande opened a conveyancing business on the Gold Coast. Through 1994 
he and his company were prosecuted by the Law Society under the Queensland Law 
Society Act for unlawful legal practice, and were convicted. Sande nevertheless had 
also begun to apply for admission as a solicitor, albeit subject to conditions that 
would restrict his work to that which can be undertaken by conveyancers in South 
Australia or NSW. 
The first application was made in July 1994 under the Mutual Recognition Act 
for ‘admission to the roll of conveyancers’ or as a solicitor. In August, the Supreme 
Court Registrar refused both applications. This was challenged, first, by an 
application to the Supreme Court in Re Sande (‘Sande 1A’).89 Fryberg J refused that 
application in March 1995. However, the Registrar’s decision was also challenged 
by federal proceedings for administrative review. At that point, the Law Society 
again intervened and sought a declaration in the Supreme Court that the Registrar’s 
decision was correct. In May 1995 in Re Queensland Law Society Incorporated 
(‘Sande 1B’),90 Derrington J refused this declaration simply because, at that stage, to 
grant it would subvert the application for administrative review. However, in August 
1995 in Sande and Registrar Supreme Court of Queensland (‘Sande 1C’),91 the AAT 
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also affirmed the Registrar’s decision to refuse the applications for admission. Sande 
therefore appealed, but in proceedings decided in February 1996 – Sande v 
Registrar, Supreme Court of Queensland (‘Sande 1D’)92 – the Full Court of the 
Federal Court dismissed the appeal. 
The Sande 1 series was still underway when, in April 1995, Sande re-applied 
for admission as a solicitor in identical terms to the application in Sande 1A. The 
Registrar refused this in May 1995, but later that month Sande applied for admission 
a third time. While these applications were made, Sande was still being paid for 
conveyancing he was undertaking on the Gold Coast. At that point (before Sande 1C 
was heard), the Law Society sought an injunction to restrain Sande from working as 
a conveyancer. In this case, Queensland Law Society Inc v Sande (‘Sande 2A’),93 it 
became clearer that the reason for these repeated applications for admission was that, 
although Sande knew they were destined to fail,94 he thought he could take 
advantage of the ‘deemed registration’ provisions of the Mutual Recognition Act. 
These stated that someone was deemed to be registered in an occupation in the State 
while their application for registration was pending.95 Sande repeatedly applied for 
admission as a solicitor on the understanding that, while any single application 
before the Registrar was still undecided, he was deemed to be registered as a 
conveyancer under the Mutual Recognition Act. In June 1995, Thomas J accepted 
that the second and third applications for admission were being made for an ulterior 
purpose, and that they were an abuse of the court’s process. A declaration was made 
to that effect. Thomas J also restrained Sande from doing any conveyancing work in 
Queensland (regardless of Sande’s interpretation of the Mutual Recognition Act), but 
gave him the benefit of the doubt on the third application for admission that was still 
on foot. The injunction was therefore made conditional on the Registrar’s refusal of 
the third application for admission. 
From the proceedings that followed, the Registrar apparently did refuse 
Sande’s third application for admission. Sande nevertheless continued to offer 
conveyancing services in Queensland, and so the Law Society moved to have him 
cited for contempt. These proceedings – Queensland Law Society Inc v Sande (No 2) 
(‘Sande 2B’)96 – again came before Thomas J. He accepted that the Society had 
proved 14 instances of conveyancing by Sande in breach of the injunction issued in 
Sande 2A, and that there were continuing breaches of the Supreme Court Act 186797 
and the Queensland Law Society Act. Sande was in contempt of court, and given a 
suspended sentence of three months imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.98 The Sande 2 
series, in particular, has been important for articulating the legal scope of the 
conveyancing reservation. 
 
B   ‘Legal Practice’: Nature, Scope and Reservation 
 
The core of legal work is allowed to lawyers qualified as such under legal 
profession legislation, and no one else. In almost all Australian jurisdictions, the 
qualification for someone to be able to do any work that is within this reservation is 
that she is, in the words of the Model Laws on national legal practice, an ‘Australian 
legal practitioner’. This means a person who is both ‘an Australian lawyer’ – 
                                                 
92  (1996) 134 ALR 560. 
93  [1996] 1 Qd R 622. 
94  Ibid, 628. 
95  Section 25(1) Mutual Recognition (Queensland) Act 1992 (Qld).  
96  [1998] 1 Qd R 273. 
97  By the time of Sande 2B, s 41 Supreme Court Act 1867 (Qld) had been re-enacted as s 
19 Legal Practitioners Act 1995 (Qld).  
98  [1998] 1 Qd R 273, 302. 
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someone who has been admitted in any State or Territory as a lawyer99 – and who 
‘holds a current practising certificate or a current interstate practising certificate’.100 
Only a certified lawyer is able to undertake legal work. 
The term used in the Model Laws to describe the legal nature and scope of this 
exclusive reservation is ‘legal practice’.101 So, section 24(1) of the Queensland Legal 
Profession Act states: 
 
A person must not engage in legal practice in this jurisdiction unless the person is an 
Australian legal practitioner. 
 
Violation of this reservation is a criminal offence throughout Australia and, in 
some States, can attract a custodial sentence.102  
Since the nineteenth century, the ban on unqualified people undertaking ‘legal 
practice’ has given rise to adjudication and judicial interpretation of the meaning of 
‘legal practice’, or of equivalent terms that have been used in legislation relating to 
the legal profession. However, Australian exegesis of ‘legal practice’ has been 
especially indebted to Florida cases that made some effort to distil the essence of the 
practice of law. In State ex rel Florida Bar v Sperry,103 the Supreme Court of Florida 
held that a patent attorney, who held himself out as such, was illegally engaged in 
legal practice in Florida even though he had been admitted as a patent attorney by the 
US Patent Office.104 O’Connell J said:105 
 
… representing another before the courts is the practice of law. But the practice of 
law also includes the giving of legal advice and counsel to others as to their rights 
and obligations under the law and the preparation of legal instruments, including 
contracts, by which legal rights are either obtained, secured or given away, although 
such matters may not then or ever be the subject of proceedings in a court. 
 
This was followed in Florida Bar v Town,106 once more by a court led by 
O’Connell J. The Florida cases therefore recognise a broad range of activities, 
beyond the giving of legal advice, as being within the reservation of legal practice to 
attorneys. However, it is the giving of legal advice that Australian courts have 
concentrated on when using the Florida jurisprudence to draw the boundaries of legal 
practice.107 
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 The central, though not exclusive, role of the giving of legal advice in 
identifying the nature of ‘legal practice’ was confirmed in the leading Australian case 
on the point, Cornall v Nagle.108 This, too, somewhat akin to Sperry, dealt with a 
defendant who had been describing himself as an ‘attorney and agent’, but who also 
drafted, prepared and filed court documents and unsuccessfully applied to a 
Magistrates Court to appear for a client in a rehearing. Phillips J held that this 
infringed the reservation of legal practice for solicitors, and following Sperry agreed 
that, where the giving of legal advice was concerned, the public are to be protected 
from the untrained and the unqualified with the result that the task will ordinarily be 
regarded as the exclusive province of professionals who were trained and duly 
qualified.109 That said, Phillips J thought that the ‘untrained’ or ‘unqualified’ would 
be in breach of the prohibition on ‘acting or practising as a solicitor’ (as the Victorian 
legislation then described ‘legal practice’):110 
 
(1) by doing something which, though not required to be done exclusively by a 
solicitor, is usually done by a solicitor and by doing it in such a way as to 
justify the reasonable inference that the person doing it is a solicitor. 
(2) by doing something that is positively proscribed by [legislation] unless done 
by a duly qualified legal practitioner. 
(3) by doing something which, in order that the public may be adequately 
protected, is required to be done only by those who have the necessary training 
and expertise in the law. For present purposes, it is unnecessary to go beyond 
the example of the giving of legal advice as part of a course of conduct and for 
reward. 
 
In Law Society of NSW v Seymour,111 the NSW Court of Appeal expressed 
concern about two aspects of Cornall and, to that extent, a narrower approach to the 
reservation seems to be settled in that State.112 In relation to the first meaning of legal 
practice in Cornall, it was noted that there are activities regularly performed by 
lawyers that are also commonly – and lawfully - done by accountants, merchant 
bankers and financial advisers.113 It has also been recognised that migration and 
customs agents, like tax agents, give legal advice that touches on areas of the 
expertise and in which they can lawfully give advice.114 The Seymour court also 
thought that the third meaning of legal practice in Cornall was too widely expressed, 
and would improperly bring work undertaken by other legally qualified persons such 
as judges, legal academics and arbitrators within the sphere of prohibited work.115 
This approach narrows the lawyers’ reservation considerably. In Seymour, a 
‘business consultant and migration agent’ (who had been removed as a solicitor) 
gave legal advice on patent transactions, advised on a leasing matter and had some 
involvement in a family law dispute. However, he was held not to have engaged in 
legal practice, especially as solicitors who had dealt with him were aware that he was 
not a solicitor.116  
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It is difficult to reconcile Seymour with both the concerns and decision in 
Sperry. In any case, Australian courts outside NSW have generally accepted the 
three ways that Phillips J defined legal practice in Cornall as authoritative.117 For 
instance, unqualified people have been held to have illegally engaged in legal 
practice for giving legal advice on terms of a contract;118 preparing and filing court 
documents;119 giving assistance to people preparing wills (even when a do-it-
yourself will kit is used);120 witnessing a guarantee and giving a related certificate; 
presenting an office as a solicitor’s office; sitting in, giving legal advice during and 
intervening during police interviews of ‘clients’; and conducting negotiations as a 
‘solicitor’.121 An unqualified person who represents that she is a lawyer of some kind 
will provide good evidence of unlawful legal practice.122 The conduct of a 
conveyance of land is squarely within the definition of legal practice.  
 
1   The Law on Conveyancing 
 
Nineteenth century English adjudication on the meaning of conveyancing 
deferred almost entirely to the opinion of conveyancers.123 Apart from being a 
dangerous approach to a penal provision, any subjective assessment of the scope of 
the reservation would, now, necessarily be incompatible with the more basic 
definition of ‘legal practice’ in Cornall v Nagle. At least if the third aspect of Cornall 
is taken to govern the scope of the reservation, the definition of conveyancing within 
a Torrens system is now anchored in the judgment of the NSW Supreme Court in In 
the Will of Kerrigan.124 Under her will, the testatrix in Kerrigan had appointed a 
certificated conveyancer as her executor, but also provided that he could only draw 
on the estate to pay his ‘ordinary legal costs’. These costs could be assessed by the 
Supreme Court Registrar, who understood the will as limiting the executor’s 
entitlement to costs that he could charge for as a conveyancer. A reference to the Full 
Court therefore required the court to determine what work was captured by the 
practice of conveyancing. Pulling on Attorneys had defined conveyancing as ‘the 
drawing of legal documents, and investigating and advising on legal titles’. Jordan 
CJ (with whom Stephen and Street JJ agreed) – in both developing and qualifying 
the definition in Pulling – believed that conveyancing included: 
 
… preparing any document or doing any act for the purpose of creating, transferring 
or extinguishing any interest in any form of property, and anything incidental or 
ancillary to any such act, where the document or act is of a kind calling for 
something more than ordinary business knowledge, skill or ability.125 
 
It was taken to include two tasks that the executor in Kerrigan had charged to 
the estate: dealings with the revenue authorities (and particularly stamps offices) that 
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are associated with the terms of transferring property; and the preparation of a return 
for federal estate duty.126 The second of these must now be disputed. However, 
Jordan CJ also believed that, given the traditional work of conveyancers in NSW, the 
definition from Pulling was too broad, and he would not accept that conveyancers 
could ‘prepare papers for the purpose of proceedings in Court’.127 Thomas J accepted 
the Kerrigan court’s definition of conveyancing, almost without qualification, in 
Sande 2B.128 He also accepted the Kerrigan example of attending at, and 
communicating with, the stamps office as an instance of conveyancing,129 but did not 
mention Kerrigan’s second example of preparing a return for estate duty. As noted, 
this is not easily captured by Kerrigan’s general definition of conveyancing work as 
being ‘for the purpose of creating, transferring or extinguishing any interest in any 
form of property’,130 and Thomas J’s ignoring this second example in Sande 2B 
could be understood as implicitly excluding it from the scope of conveyancing. 
Accordingly, courts have accepted a range of tasks from the point of entering a 
land sale contract to the registration of transfer documents after settlement of the 
contract as being within the definition of ‘conveyancing’ and, it follows, within the 
definition of ‘legal practice’. There is judicial authority for the following as 
potentially being aspects of conveyancing: 
 
• Explaining the terms of the contract to the client, and especially its salient 
points and any unusual provisions.131 It has been confirmed that this 
explanation is required in conveyancing practice even when, as is usual in 
Queensland,132 the contract was signed before the solicitor was retained.133 
• Explaining to the client what usual protections are not found in the contract 
the client has signed.134  
• Investigating the title to the land.135 
• Undertaking searches relevant to the land.136 
• Preparing requisitions on title, or answers to them.137 
• Preparing transfer documents. These are, of course, the actual conveyances 
of title and, although in a much simplified standard form in Torrens systems, 
the documents that are central to conveyancing practice.138 Accordingly, 
even simple exercises of filling in the blanks, or arranging a signature, on a 
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standard form transfer document amounts to ‘conveyancing’ and ‘legal 
practice’.139    
• Attending to the stamping of land contracts and transfer documents.140 
• Arranging for the satisfaction of mortgages.141 
• Preparing mortgage documents.142 
• Drawing a discharge of a mortgage.143 
• Preparing notices to a body corporate under group title legislation.144 
• Calculating settlement figures.145  
• Preparing settlement statements.146 
• Organising settlement.147 
• Advising the client when difficulties arise.148 
• Undertaking negotiations for the client when difficulties arise.149 
• Lodging land transfer documents for registration.150 
• Arranging the payment of registration fees.151  
 
In Sande 2B, it was emphasised that the coordination of these activities also 
amounts to conveyancing practice.152 Indeed, it is coordinating these activities in the 
correct sequence, and in accordance with the terms of the contract, its time limits and 
other conditions of performance, that the skill and expertise of the lawyer would be 
most needed. 
Australian adjudication has also insisted that the business that receives payment 
for the service of arranging the conveyance is itself involved in conveyancing 
practice, even if it outsources the legal aspects of the transaction to legally qualified 
people. For instance, in Law Society of NSW v Ramalca Pty Ltd153 – a case decided 
before nonlawyer conveyancing was legalised in NSW – a company offered flat-fee 
conveyancing services, but outsourced any work that was properly reserved to 
lawyers to a non-practising barrister. However, the outsourcing was incomplete as 
the barrister effectively worked within the company’s business organisation. He was 
paid a daily rate, did all of the work on the company’s premises, and used its 
secretarial staff. The client made one payment for the service to the company itself. 
The NSW Court of Appeal held, for two reasons, that the company was engaged in 
illegal conveyancing. According to Priestley JA, when the company paid the 
barrister to complete conveyancing tasks, it was ‘in a legal metaphorical sense’ 
                                                 
139  Beeston and Stapleford Urban District Council v Smith [1949] 1 KB 656, 661. Eg, In re 
Cooper; Ex parte Hall (1890) 16 VLR 802; cf In re Simpson & Fricke; Ex parte 
Robinson [1910] VLR 177. 
140  In the Will of Kerrigan (1935) SR (NSW) 242, 250; Sande 2B [1998] 1 Qd R 273, 296. 
See also In re King; Ex parte the Incorporated Law Institute of NSW (1887) 8 NSWR 
395, 396-7.  
141  Sande 2B [1998] 1 Qd R 273, 296. 
142  Beeston and Stapleford Urban District Council v Smith [1949] 1 KB 656, 663. 
143  Re Crowley (1899) 20 LR (NSW) 150, 151, 152, although there was no breach of the 
legislation as the discharge had not been drawn for the personal reward of the 
respondent. See also Sande 2B [1998] 1 Qd R 273, 299. 
144  Sande 2B [1998] 1 Qd R 273, 300-1, 302. 
145  Queensland Law Society Inc v Hoy [1995] QSC 169. 
146  Sande 2B [1998] 1 Qd R 273, 296. 
147  Queensland Law Society Inc v Hoy [1995] QSC 169; Sande 2B [1998] 1 Qd R 273, 296. 
148  Sande 2B [1998] 1 Qd R 273, 296. 
149  Ibid, 296. 
150 Ibid, 296. 
151  See In re King; Ex parte the Incorporated Law Institute of NSW (1887) 8 NSWR 395, 
396-7. 
152  Sande 2B [1998] 1 Qd R 273, 296. 
153  (1988) 12 NSWLR 35. 
267  The University of Queensland Law Journal 2009 
 
 
directly involved in conveyancing work.154 Secondly, it was irrelevant that the 
barrister might have been exercising an independent professional judgment when, 
say, drawing transfer documents for the conveyance. Everything the barrister did was 
within the company’s business organisation and so, in that respect, the company was 
indirectly engaged in conveyancing work for payment.155 The principles for 
attributing the conduct of a land transaction to the nonlawyer conveyancing company 
in Ramalca were then thinned and rationalised by Thomas J in Sande 2B156 - a case 
where the outsourcing was more completely realised. After Sande 2A,157 when an 
injunction was issued to restrain Sande and his company from conducting land 
transactions in Queensland, the standard retainer for the company provided that it 
would ‘arrange for Duncan, Sande and Associates’ [DSA] to prepare, stamp and 
register transfer documents and act as DSA’s agent. DSA was a conveyancing 
practice in South Australia and, despite its name, was no longer owned by Sande or 
his company. The idea was therefore to have the transfer documents drawn by a 
different entity that was outside Queensland and not targeted by the Sande 2A 
injunction. Sande’s company paid a small fixed fee to DSA for each transaction. 
However, Thomas J described this as ‘a failed attempt to obtain the benefits of legal 
practice by means of artificial subdivisions, agencies and franchises’.158 He focused 
on one aspect only of Ramalca: the offering of a service (that included legal tasks) 
for payment. Irrespective of what arrangements Sande’s company might make for 
legal tasks to be outsourced out-of-State, the company earned its profits by providing 
in the State an ‘overall service’ that involved conveyancing work.159 Thomas J did 
not consider the Ramalca limb that attributed legal work to the company because 
documents were drawn by a barrister working within the business organisation.  
The Ramalca analysis left open the question whether outsourcing arrangements 
could be lawful when the conveyancing business is not incorporated.160 Although the 
incorporation of a nonlawyer conveyancing business does not appear to be necessary 
in Sande 2B for attributing the conduct of legal practice to the business, a company 
was also involved in Sande 2B and, therefore, it does not provide a clear distinction 
from Ramalca on the point. Ironically – as we will see in our second article – it is 
now the corporate form of a business that will allow lawful Ramalca-like 
arrangements for conveyancing in Queensland. 
The other side of this principle is that, as long as the ‘business’ that receives 
payment for conveyancing services is a law practice – as defined now in the Legal 
Profession Act 2007 (Qld) – the services are provided lawfully even if the work is 
done by legally unqualified people or outsourced to unqualified people.161 Indeed, it 
is common, particularly in practices that specialise in conveyancing, for paralegal or 
administrative staff to do most of the work.      
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was initially taken by Ipp J in Attorney-General (WA) v Quill Wills Ltd (1990) 3 WAR 
500, 515, although in the case of unlawful willmaking. 
160  In this respect, Priestley JA in Ramalca (1988) 12 NSWLR 34, 41-2 distinguished 
Reynolds v Hoyle [1976] 1 WLR 207 and Green v Hoyle [1976] 1 WLR 575 where 
arrangements for nonlawyer conveyancing were held lawful, in part, because they were 
conducted for no charge within a voluntary unincorporated association. 
161  Cf Legal Services Commissioner v McClelland [2006] LPT 013, where the objection 
was not that the solicitor outsourced work to a nonlawyer conveyancer, but that he 
shared receipts with her. 
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The case law also recognises particular tasks in the penumbra of conveyancing 
practice that, in themselves, do not necessarily amount to ‘legal practice’. Thus, 
preparing a vendor disclosure statement required under land sales legislation does 
not necessarily amount to ‘legal practice’.162 It has also been recognised that some 
aspects of conveyancing work are of a clerical or secretarial quality, do not demand 
the attention of legally skilled professionals to complete properly and, for that 
reason, are outside the reservation. The Queensland courts have affirmed the 
prospect of law-related but ‘mechanical or clerical’ work in relation to land 
transactions,163 but have only once allowed it as an escape for those accused of 
unlawful meddling in legal work. In Sande 2B the correction of spelling mistakes on 
transfer documents was regarded as a clerical exercise. It was therefore not treated as 
the equivalent of preparing an instrument relating to real estate, and so was not 
regarded as illegal.164 
 
2   The Agents’ Exception 
  
Although the Law Society still maintains that the conduct of land transactions 
must be entrusted exclusively to solicitors, it has long allowed a significant aspect of 
conveyancing to be done by real estate agents – the preparation and formation of the 
land sale contract. An idiosyncratic feature of Queensland conveyancing practice 
(when compared with the practice elsewhere in Australia) has been that, almost 
universally in residential conveyancing, the contract of sale is not even sent to a 
solicitor until a real estate agent has concluded the negotiations between buyer and 
seller; discussed with (in the main) the buyer important terms like price, 
preconditions as to finance and other sales, inspections and settlement date; 
completed any details in the contract that are needed to give effect to those terms; 
and sometimes inserted special clauses that deal with unusual arrangements.  
The Queensland Law Society has allowed real estate agents to have the 
principal role in the formation of land sale contracts, and of all aspects of 
conveyancing before that, for decades.165 Furthermore, it has openly endorsed this 
practice by collaborating with the Real Estate Institute of Queensland in developing 
and approving the standard residential property sale contract.166 The Law Society has 
arguably, therefore, acquiesced in allowing aspects of ‘legal practice’ to real estate 
agents and, until 2004, without any statutory authorisation for agents to intrude into 
the exclusive reservation of conveyancing for solicitors (and barristers).  
It may be that, under the Seymour approach to the scope of ‘legal practice’, the 
long term practice of allowing real estate agents to deal with all arrangements up to 
the formation of the contract could take this outside the reservation. Seymour 
effectively recognised that activities regularly done by other professions and 
                                                 
162  Law Institute of Victoria v Maric [2006] VSC 361. 
163  Queensland Law Society Inc v Hoy [1995] QSC 169, following Barristers Board v 
KWA, Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia (Anderson J), 23 April 1992.  
164  Sande 2B [1998] 1 Qd R 273, 300. 
165  The Real Estate Institute of Queensland originally recommended a general form 
contract of sale which was approved for general use by the Queensland Law Society in 
1972. Since then, revisions of the standard contract have been either prepared or 
approved by the REIQ and the Law Society with the expectation that the real estate 
agent must provide the details not only to complete the contract, but to give it certainty 
and effect: WD Duncan, Real Estate Agency Law in Queensland (4th ed, 2006) 64-5. 
166  See now Real Estate Institute of Queensland and Queensland Law Society, Contract for 
Houses and Residential Land (6th ed, 2005). It appears that the REIQ’s involvement in 
the development of the standard land sale contract was initially motivated by the need to 
simplify the language of Queensland Law Society standard form contracts.   
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occupational groups might not be reserved exclusively for lawyers.167 However, this 
is unlikely to be the law in Queensland. In Sande 2B, Thomas J accepted the Sperry-
Cornall approach to the meaning of ‘legal practice’ and, further, the Kerrigan 
formulation of the work of a conveyancer.168 When the issue is viewed through this 
lens, the stronger argument is that the conventional role of real estate agents involves 
aspects of conveyancing work – specifically ‘preparing any document or doing any 
act for the purpose of creating … any interest in any form of property’.169 Although 
with Torrens land the legal estate does not pass until transfer documents have been 
registered after settlement, the signing of an unconditional contract immediately 
creates an equitable interest in the land. Even if the contract is subject to a condition 
precedent (like the approval of finance), it is likely that the agent has been involved 
in preparing a document that sees equitable rights created.170 
Although Australian adjudication on the point is scarce,171 in Florida Bar v 
Irizarry172 the Supreme Court of Florida held that:173 
 
…the practice of law includes…the preparation of…contracts, by which legal rights 
are either obtained, secured or given away… 
 
Irizarry involved real estate agents preparing land sale contracts (and more).174 
It was a direct application of the court’s earlier decisions in Sperry and Town,175 
which through Cornall have shaped the predominant Australian approach to the 
meaning of ‘legal practice’. The American adjudication also regards incidental 
advice about the effect of land sale documents as legal practice.176 However, 
significant differences in opinion have arisen as to whether someone who merely 
‘filled in blanks’ of a standard form land sale contract is involved in legal practice. 
                                                 
167  Law Society of NSW v Seymour [1999] NSWCA 117, [18].  
168  [1998] 1 Qd R 273, 289, 291. 
169  In the Will of Kerrigan (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 242, 250; Sande 2B [1998] 1 Qd R 273, 
289, 291. 
170  Ie, under the principle of Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 ChD 499, 506-10 that, once a 
contract becomes specifically performable, the buyer is considered in equity to be the 
owner of the property. The may be rights in equity even if specific performance is not 
available. 
171  However, see Re Simpson & Fricke; Ex parte Robinson [1910] VLR 177, where a father 
and son entered an agreement to transfer land to the son after the father’s death, and was 
held not to violate the Victorian reservation of preparing land title documents to 
solicitors and conveyancers. However, this does not support the suggestion that the 
preparation of an agreement is not legal practice. The document in Simpson & Fricke 
was an agreement prepared by the parties themselves, and the question was whether the 
document was of a kind captured by the ban on ‘drawing a conveyance’ in s 261 
Supreme Court Act 1890 (Vic) (the successor to the Attorneys’ Bills and Conveyancing 
Act). It was not whether (had the document been prepared by someone else for a fee) the 
preparation of a contract was within the scope of ‘legal practice’. Cf the Texas decision 
in Hexter Title and Abstract Co Inc v Grievance Committee, Fifth Congressional 
District, State Bar of Texas, 179 SW (2d) 946 (1944). 
172  268 So (2d) 377 (1972). 
173  Ibid, 379. 
174  For other decisions recognising the preparation of land sale contracts as legal practice, 
see Clark v Rearden, 231 Mo App 666, 670; 104 SW 2d 407, 410 (1937); People ex rel 
Illinois Bar Association v Schafer, 404 Ill 45, 50; 87 NE (2d) 773, 776 (1949); Chicago 
Bar Association v Quinlan and Tyson Inc, 53 Ill App 2d 388, 396; 203 NE (2d) 131, 
136 (1964).  
175  See text at above nn 103-106. 
176  Rattikin Title Company v Grievance Committee of the State Bar of Texas, 272 SW (2d) 
948, 951 (1954); People v Sipper, 64 Cal App Supp 2d 844; 142 P (2d) 960 (1943).  
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There have been American State courts that treat this as merely a clerical exercise, 
requiring nothing more than ordinary business judgment.177 As recently as 1996, the 
Attorney-General for New York advised that real estate agents could lawfully 
complete fill-in-the-blank form contracts so long as the contracts had been prepared 
by attorneys or approved by a ‘recognised bar association in conjunction with a 
recognised realtor’s association’.178 On the other hand, the use of a standard form has 
been held still to demand the exercise of a legally skilled judgment that the contract 
is adapted to the transaction and, so, has been regarded as work reserved exclusively 
for attorneys.179 However, reviewing the competing authorities in People ex rel 
Illinois State Bar Association v Schafer,180 the Supreme Court of Illinois pointed out 
the tension between, on the one hand, the risks of mechanical form filling and, on the 
other, the inevitability of intruding into legal work if more care were taken. Simpson 
J said:181 
 
One who merely fills in certain blanks when other pertinent information should be 
elicited and considered is rendering little service but is acting in a manner calculated 
to produce trouble. When filling in blanks as directed he may not by that simple act 
be practicing law, but if he elicits the proper information and considers it and 
advises and acts thereon he would in all probability be practicing law. In other 
words, if his service does not amount to the practice of law it is without material 
value; but if it is of material value it would likely amount to the practice of law.    
 
The Queensland practice – with the standard REIQ-QLS land sale contract – 
meets the conditions of the New York Attorney-General’s Opinion, but the law in 
Queensland is not likely to be as relaxed as it is in New York. In Sande 2B,182 the 
Supreme Court of Queensland would recognise only the correcting of spelling errors 
in documents as a clerical or secretarial exercise, and filling in the blanks on transfer 
forms was regarded as legal practice.   
As a result, while interstate nonlawyer conveyancers have met Law Society 
resistance to their attempts through litigation and political lobbying to lower barriers 
to offering conveyancing services, real estate agents have been allowed to undertake 
an important aspect of conveyancing. This was originally allowed simply by 
‘prosecutorial nullification’183 – the Law Society’s tacit refusal to prosecute agents 
for violating the reservation. It was more recently allowed and regularised by express 
statutory exception to the ‘legal practice’ reservation in the Legal Profession Act 
2004 (Qld).184 The current expression of the agents’ exception in the Act of 2007 is 
for:185 
 
… work performed by a [Property Agents and Motor Dealers’ Act 2000 (Qld)] 
licensee, or by an employee of a PAMDA licensee, if the licensee or employee only 
                                                 
177  Gustafson v Taylor, 138 Ohio St 392, 398; 35 NE (2d) 435, 439 (1941). 
178  See Joyce Palomar, ‘The War Between Attorneys and Lay Conveyancers – Empirical 
Evidence Says “Cease Fire!”’ (1991) 31 Connecticut Law Review 423, 433.  
179  Washington State Bar Association v Washington Association of Realtors, 41 Wash 2d 
697; 251 P 2d 619 (1952); People v Sipper, 61 Cal App Supp 2d 844; 142 P 2d 960 
(1943).  
180  404 Ill 45; 87 NE 2d 773 (1949). 
181  404 Ill 45, 54; 87 NE 2d 773, 777-8 (1949). 
182  [1998] 1 Qd R 273, 300. 
183  Ie, the effect of the law is nullified by an official refusal to enforce it – especially where 
the law ‘seems out of tune with contemporary sentiment’: W Simon, The Practice of 
Justice: A Theory of Lawyers’ Ethics (1998) 84.  
184  S 24(2)(e) Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld). 
185  Qld, s 24(2)(e). 
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fills in details in a preprinted contract or other document as part of performing the 
work of a PAMDA licensee and does not give advice about the contract or other 
document or the details that are filled in. 
 
The agents’ exception, carefully limited to ‘filling in blanks’, requires some 
comment. First, it reinforces the central place that giving legal advice is regarded as 
having under the Sperry-Cornall approach to legal practice, and so tries to exclude 
agents from advising on the effect of the contract. Efforts have also been made at 
placing external constraints on agents’ slipping into the giving of legal advice. An 
agent must give a written statement to a buyer of land that the buyer should seek 
independent legal advice about the contract.186 Secondly, it is most likely a genuine 
exception to the exclusive reservation of legal practice to lawyers. As we have seen, 
some American courts consider filling in blanks in a standard form contract – 
especially one endorsed by a lawyers’ professional association – as a clerical 
activity. But Sande 2B did not go this far. To the extent that it can be determined in 
Queensland, correcting spelling mistakes on documents is the only activity relating 
to land transactions that is plainly treated as clerical. Thirdly, the line between 
‘filling in blanks’ and giving advice is almost impossible to police, despite the 
warnings given to buyers,187 and may therefore itself be subject to a pragmatic 
prosecutorial nullification. For the agent, it will sometimes be dangerous actually not 
to cross the line. With the Illinois Supreme Court in Schafer, we may wonder how, 
when ‘filling in’ the blanks of the standard contract, the agent could do so merely on 
the buyer’s directions without exercising the judgment needed to select the right 
contract and, having been advised of the buyer’s circumstances, selecting which 
clauses to trigger or add to the contract.188 The standard REIQ-QLS contract requires 
agents to complete the document in ways that differently shape the terms of the 
contract around the peculiarities of the given transaction – to fill in or leave blank 
sections that render finance, inspection, electrical safety and smoke alarm terms 
operative or inoperative; to add other preconditions and terms for the payment of the 
agent’s commission. It is almost inconceivable that a diligent agent could perform 
this role without explaining the effect of the contract, or why at least information is 
needed from the parties if the standard contract details are to be completed safely. 
 
 
III   CONCLUSION 
 
The implications that the Queensland solicitors’ (qualified) conveyancing 
reservation have for competition law and policy remain of concern while the 
National Competition Council disagrees with the Queensland Government’s 
explanations for prohibiting access to nonlawyer conveyancers that other States 
allow.189 In the next Part – to be published in a subsequent edition of the University 
of Queensland Law Journal – we will consider these implications. This will involve 
an analysis of conveyancing markets in Queensland and the impact that competition 
law has on them. Secondly, we consider that, as a matter of competition policy – not 
law – whether the current ‘legal practice’ barrier to entry should be maintained. And 
                                                 
186  Section 366D Property Agents and Motor Dealers’ Act 2000 (Qld); Form 30c. 
187  Ibid. 
188  404 Ill 45, 54; 87 NE 2d 773, 777-8 (1949). 
189  There are nevertheless weighty arguments that competition law and policy should not be 
applied to the legal profession. See JJ Spigelman, ‘Are Lawyers Lemons? Competition 
Principles and Professional Regulation’ (2003) 77 Australian Law Journal 44, 50; R 
Sackville ‘Welcome Address’ (Speech delivered at the Faculty of Law Prize Ceremony 
2004, University of New South Wales, 10 March 2004). 
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thirdly, as competition-based reforms have already been made to the profession in 
the Legal Profession Acts, the implications these have for nonlawyer access to 
conveyancing markets will also be discussed. We believe that serious consideration 
must be given to the possibility that, even if more by accident than design, reforms 
that have already been made to the legal profession in Queensland may have brought 
conveyancing markets to the point where the State is now complying with national 
competition policy. 
 
 
 
